The scope of civil restraint orders (Nursing and Midwifery Council and another v Harrold)

CA – Nursing and Midwifery Council and another v Harrold 2020 EWHC 1108 (QB)

This case provides an outline of the principles to be applied when both considering the making, and the extending, of a civil restraint order (CRO). In appropriate cases, it is clear that such an order may extend to proceedings brought in the Employment Tribunal. However, in the instant case, the judge held that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court should not be utilised to expand the scope of the general civil restraint order (GCRO) to include complaints made about parties’ legal advisors to their professional regulators. There were a number of reasons for this, including the fact that the order sought was not directly concerned with preventing an abuse of the High Court or any inferior court, and the fact that the inherent jurisdiction is said to be ‘unlimited’ does not mean that judges may do whatever they consider appropriate or desirable in the circumstances of a case.

This article was first published by Lexis®PSL on 11/05/2020

 Click on case name above for full article

Issue estoppel and abuse of process in respect of foreign judgments (Mad Atelier International v Manès)

CA – Issue estoppel and abuse of process in respect of foreign judgments (Mad Atelier International v Manès)

This case provides a useful outline of the complicated questions that will arise in respect of an argument that a claim brought in England is an abuse of process, where a linked judgment has been obtained outside of the jurisdiction. Key to the question of abuse will be the precise nature of the two disputes and the parties in question, as well as the presence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause within the contract providing that England is the relevant forum.

This article was first published by Lexis®PSL on 30/04/2020

Click on case name for PDF link

 

 

 

The making of group litigation orders in the context of competing solicitors’ firms (Lungowe and others v Vedanta Resources plc)

CA 1690 – The making of group litigation orders in the context of competing solicitors firms (Lungowe and others v Vedanta Resources plc)

This case deals with the various considerations when the court is being asked to make a group litigation order, particularly, where competing solicitors’ firms are acting for a number of claimants. It was made plain that, submissions which are underpinned by a commercial advantage to the solicitors acting for claimants retaining their involvement independently from other claimant firms, will not find favour with the courts.

This article was first published by Lexis®PSL on 16/04/2020

Click on case name for link to full article

 

 

Business as usual? High Court to hear five-week trial remotely in light of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic (Re One Blackfriars Ltd)

CA 1672 – Business as usual High Court to hear five-week trial remotely in light of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic (Re One Blackfriars Ltd)

This case involved an opposed application to adjourn a fiveweek trial listed in June 2020 in light of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. The application to adjourn was dismissed, and the judge gave helpful guidance in terms of how best parties can prepare for such a hearing to be heard remotely. It also provides guidance in terms of the health and safety considerations, the heightened duty for parties to cooperate, and the compatibility of such hearings taking place in light of the Prime Minister’s instructions to the nation to stay at home. The judge also referred to two recent complex trials which had, for the most part, proceeded remotely without significant issue. The guidance and advice in the current climate is fast paced and frequently evolving but it seems as though courts are adapting well to these challenges, and multi-party complex cases may still well proceed. In the instant case, if the application to adjourn had been successful, the trial would not have been re-listed for a year.

This article was first published by Lexis®PSL on 09/04/2020

For full article click on case name above

 

Adjourning complex FRAND trials in the current health crisis—(Conversant Wireless Licensing v Huawei Technologies)

CA 1652 – Adjourning complex FRAND trials in the current health crisis—(Conversant Wireless Licensing v Huawei Technologies)

This case involved the application of Huawei to adjourn a trial in a FRAND case. Conversant instead sought that the trial was conducted, for the most part, on the papers. The judge outlined the relevant case law and current guidance from the Lord Chancellor. Crucially, the Civil Procedure Rules had not been amended such that it was appropriate for the conduct of a FRAND trial to go forward on the papers. While the judge accepted that it may well be that the FRAND trial, while not straightforward, could be in danger of becoming unnecessarily complex, there were bound to be issues, a significant number of them, which would require cross-examination in the usual way. Accordingly, the trial was adjourned.

This article was first published by Lexis®PSL on 06/04/2020

Click on case name above for link

 

An analysis of disclosure obligations in respect of custodians and agents (BES v Cheshire West)

CA 1638 – An analysis of disclosure obligations in respect of custodians and agents (BES v Cheshire West)

This case provides a useful reminder of the relevant issues relating to requests for further disclosure in a complex multi-party case. It remains the position that a parent company does not merely by virtue of being a 100% parent have control over a document of its subsidiaries.

Each instance will be judged on a case by case basis taking into account a number of factors and, while the absence of any genealogical corporate relationship between the parties may not be fatal for an application for disclosure, it is distinctly unhelpful.

It also reconfirms that an agent of a company involved in litigation will be required to ‘produce to the principal upon request, or to a proper person appointed by the principal, all books, correspondence and documents (including emails and other electronic material) under his control relating to the principal’s affairs’.

This article was first published by Lexis®PSL on 01/04/2020

Click on case name for full article

 

Pre-action conduct and the question of promptness when making an application to set aside a default judgment under CPR 13.3 (Core- Export v Yang Ming)

CA – Core-Export v Yang Ming

This case considers the question of pre-action conduct in respect of an application to set aside a default judgment. While finding that the delay of 23 days since the defendant became aware of the judgment was not prompt, the judge also considered that it was necessary to view the speed in which the application had been made in the context of what had gone before it; in this case, including pre-action conduct. On the face of it, this appears to sit uneasily in light of the Court of Appeal authority in the case of Macdonald v Thorn, in which the court held that it was not appropriate to consider pre-action conduct in such an application, as the ‘default’ (ie failure to file an acknowledgment/defence) was the trigger for such an application. However, the distinction is arguably that pre-action conduct will be taken into consideration where it is relevant to an evaluation of the explanation for any delay in making the application to set aside.

This article was first published by Lexis®PSL on 13/03/2020

Click on case name above for PDF text

 

 

‘Judgments on judgments’ capable of registration under the Administration of Justice Act 1920 (Strategic Technologies v Procurement Bureau of the Republic of China Ministry of National Defence)

CA – Strategic Technologies PTE Ltd v Procurement Bureau of the Republic of China Ministry of National Defence [2020] EWHC 362 (QB)

This case confirms the importance of the formal steps relating to service outside of the jurisdiction. In particular, where such steps are not undertaken in accordance with the law of the country to which service is to be effected, enforcement steps taken are liable to be set aside as premature. It also confirms that the Administration of Justice Act 1920 (AJA 1920) is broad enough to allow the registration of judgments obtained without a consideration of the merits (ie judgments in default). As such, it is permissible to register a ‘judgment on a judgment’, as AJA 1920, s 12 is very broad and the word ‘any’, in particular, is powerfully inclusive. While there is an argument for deterring the ‘laundering’ of judgments, until parliament makes legislative change, such practices are acceptable.

This article was first published by Lexis®PSL on 05/03/2020

Click on case name above for full article.

 

 

High Court confirms that variation of a disclosure order under the disclosure pilot is governed by CPR PD 51U (Conversant Wireless Licensing v Huawei)

CA – Conversant Wireless Licensing SÀRL v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd and others [2020] EWHC 256 (Pat)

This case confirms that, in a case where the disclosure pilot for the Business and Property Courts (the disclosure pilot) applies, the applicable test for revoking or varying an order for disclosure pursuant to CPR 3.1(7) must give way to the specific requirements of CPR PD 51U, para 18, which expressly sets out a different test. In particular, a court may at any stage make an order varying or revoking a previous order for extended disclosure, provided that it is necessary for the just disposal of the proceedings and that it is reasonable and proportionate. There is nothing in the disclosure pilot to suggest that applications to vary orders for extended disclosure will only be granted where something out of the ordinary has occurred.

This article was first published by Lexis®PSL on 27/02/2020

Click on case name above for the full article

Inducing a breach of contract—clarification of what amounts to a sufficient state of mind (Allen v Dodd)

CA 1549 – Allen t a David Allen Chartered Accountants v Dodd and Anr [2020] EWCA Civ 258

The issue raised on this appeal was what amounts to a sufficient state of mind to make a person liable in tort for inducing a breach of contract. It was confirmed that, if a defendant honestly believes that the act they procure will not amount to a breach of contract, they are not liable in tort even if their belief is mistaken in law. It matters not that a defendant’s erroneous belief is caused by their own ignorance or as a result of incorrect advice they receive from their lawyers.

This article was first published by Lexis®PSL on 2 March 2020

Click on case name for full text