This case considers the question of pre-action conduct in respect of an application to set aside a default judgment. While finding that the delay of 23 days since the defendant became aware of the judgment was not prompt, the judge also considered that it was necessary to view the speed in which the application had been made in the context of what had gone before it; in this case, including pre-action conduct. On the face of it, this appears to sit uneasily in light of the Court of Appeal authority in the case of Macdonald v Thorn, in which the court held that it was not appropriate to consider pre-action conduct in such an application, as the ‘default’ (ie failure to file an acknowledgment/defence) was the trigger for such an application. However, the distinction is arguably that pre-action conduct will be taken into consideration where it is relevant to an evaluation of the explanation for any delay in making the application to set aside.
This article was first published by Lexis®PSL on 13/03/2020
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